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INTRODUCTION 
Since May 1998, an important issue facing Pakistan policy-makers has been 
whether independent power producers (IPPs) produce expensive electricity. It is 
contended that IPPs’ expensive power has rendered the state utility, Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA), bankrupt. It is also alleged that IPPs indulged in 
corruption and colluded with WAPDA officials to get their signatures on contracts 
which allowed procurement of expensive power by WAPDA and which it can ill 
afford now. 
This paper shifts through the rhetoric surrounding IPPs and focuses on the 
central issue of whether IPPs produce expensive power. If it can be established that 
IPPs produce cheaper power than WAPDA, then the second part of the argument that 
WAPDA became financially weak because of IPPs’ expensive power is destroyed. 
The alleged corruption issues are not discussed as they are beyond the scope of the 
paper. 
Section 1 provides a background to the establishment of the private power 
sector in Pakistan. Section 2 discusses various project risks faced by shareholders 
and lenders. Section 3 outlines the components of the electricity tariff. Section 4 
traces the reasons for increase in electricity tariffs since 1994 when the Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPA) were signed. Section 5 shows the comparative costs of 
production of IPPs and WAPDA. 
 
1.  BACKGROUND 
In 1985, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) with the assistance of the World 
Bank formulated its long term strategy for development of the power sector in 
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Pakistan. At that time it was correctly assessed that the provision of assured and 
reliable power would spur economic growth. With energy demand growing at 12 
percent and supply at 7 percent per annum. Load shedding was rampant with 
consequential output losses for industry and agriculture. It was estimated that the 
annual gap of 2000 MW of electricity cost the country approximately $1 billion per 
year in lost GDP. Electricity was available to only 40 percent of the population and 
per capita consumption of 404 kWh was only 4 percent of that in the United States 
and 24 percent of consumption in Malaysia. 
Pakistan had to catch up fast and the development of new capacity became the 
top priority, but the Government of Pakistan (GOP) lacked the funds for 
infrastructure development. Consequently, the private sector was invited to develop 
new generating capacity. It was rationalised that the private sector would not only 
supplement public sector generation, it would also mobilise additional equity and 
debt resources and improve the efficiency in the energy sector. 
The new energy policy was implemented in a period of high political volatility 
in the early 1990s. The first Benazir Bhutto government (elected in 1988) was 
dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan in 1992. She was succeeded by Nawaz 
Sharif who initiated a number of free market reforms and also signed Pakistan’s first 
IPP contract for the largest power sector project with the Hub Power Company in 
1992. Disagreements with the President led to the dismissal of this government also, 
and an interim government was installed which held fresh elections in which the 
second Bhutto government was elected in November 1993. During its tenure, the 
Bhutto government signed a number of IPP contracts under the 1994 Power Policy 
and in June 1996, Pakistan’s first private sector power plant, the Hub Power 
Company (Hubco) came into operation. In February, 1997, the Muslim League 
government of Nawaz Sharif won the elections by a landslide and in 1998 the 
government started its investigations into IPP contracts signed under the previous 
government. As of the writing of this paper, the IPP crisis continues unabated with 
serious repercussions for international investor confidence. To-date almost $4.8 
billion of private investment in the power sector has taken place with IPPs 
accounting for almost 17 percent of the country’s total electricity generation. 
 
2.  PROJECT RISKS 
When the Government of Pakistan started its initial search for investors as 
early as 1985, it became quite apparent that there was no appetite for Pakistan risk in 
the international banking market. 
Project sponsors were facing a number of risks which the sponsor was not 
willing to take without a risk premium. The IPP investments were only undertaken 
once the risks were insured, transferred or guaranteed. Most costs were controlled 
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through contractor incentives and penalties, and guarantees or warranties. 
The risks faced by IPPs are:  
 (i) Economic Risk: Any changes in exchange rates, inflation or costs of 
finance are considered economic risk factors. 
 (ii) Market Risk: As per the PPA, IPPs can sell power only to one single 
customer, WAPDA.  This contractual arrangement exposes IPPs to the 
single customer risk. While the Government of Pakistan has given a 
guarantee to compensate the IPPs for WAPDA’s defaults on its contractual 
payments,1 the recent IPP crisis has shown that the Government of Pakistan 
is not willing to honour such guarantees on the plea that WAPDA just 
cannot afford to pay the exorbitant IPP dues. The economics of 
Government of Pakistan guarantees was specifically designed to shield the 
IPPs from the single customer default. The failure of the Government of 
Pakistan to honour such guarantees puts the IPPs under risk of insolvency 
and their own defaults towards lenders and shareholders. 
 (iii) Political and Country Risk: Political risk refers to any default by the 
Government of Pakistan on any of its contractual obligations.2 These 
largely refer to the governments guarantees to IPPs through the 
Implementation Agreement. Due to wars, nationalisations and prolonged 
military rule foreign investors were reluctant to invest without adequate 
sovereign and World Bank guarantees which were duly provided. 
 (iv) Currency and Financial Risk: Between 1982 and 1994 the rupee 
depreciated 67.6 percent cumulatively against the US dollar. Foreign 
investors are aware of the capital loss that could result due to depreciation. 
Clearly, foreign exchange risk management was required for 27–30 year 
IPP projects. Such risks were hedged through purchase of appropriate 
insurance which is built into the tariff. 
 (v) Completion and Cost Overrun Risk: The greatest period of risk in a power 
plant project occurs during the construction phase with the financial 
providers putting up most of the capital before construction starts and 
supporting this exposure till the plant is complete. 
 (vi) Performance Risk: The IPP should ensure that its Power Plant generates 
electricity according to technical specifications and deliver the required 
1An individual, apparently unconnected with WAPDA, first went to Lahore High Court and 
secured an order which stated that Hubco’s CPP be capped at Rs 845 million per month of billing, 
WAPDA, then went ahead and unilaterally reduced payments to 730 million for Hubco. 
2The Government of Pakistan has guaranteed obligations of WAPDA under the PPA, Pakistan 
State Oil (PSO) under the Fuel Supply Agreement and State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) under the Foreign 
Exchange Risk Insurance (FERI) scheme as well as the Government of Pakistan’s own future behaviour 
on taxes, duties etc. 
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power3 to WAPDA. This risk is borne by the Project Company and the 
lenders financing the project. To ensure performance, the company incurs 
maintenance expenses which are passed through in the tariff. 
 
3.  THE IPP ELECTRICITY TARIFF 
The tariff charged to WAPDA by IPPs is not a number, rather it is computed 
from a formula. The formula includes in it the components of the Fixed and Variable 
Costs. 
The total tariff is the sum of the Capacity Purchase Price (CPP) which is the 
fixed component and the Energy Purchase Price (EPP) which is the variable cost.  
The CPP4 comprises: 
 (i) Project Debt payments (inclusive of interest and principal). 
 (ii) Return on Equity which was agreed at 18 percent IRR over the project life. 
 (iii) Fixed element of the Operating and Maintenance Cost. 
 (iv) Insurance Cost for the plant. 
 (v) Foreign Exchange Risk Insurance Cost (FERI) which is the cost of 
hedging the loans against foreign exchange risk.5 
 
The EPP comprises: 
 (i) Fuel Cost which is set by the Government of Pakistan and is above the 
world oil prices by an amount of a surcharge. 
 (ii) Variable element of the operating and maintenance cost. 
The tariff paid by WAPDA also depends on the total hours purchased or the 
installed capacity utilised. While total CPP payments remain constant (in rupee terms) 
with a larger purchase of hours, the per kilowatt CPP cost to WAPDA falls. This is so 
because the fixed costs are now spread over more units of purchased power. In fact, 
WAPDA has not been buying enough power to reduce its average costs. In 1998, 
WAPDA utilised only 55 percent of the available plant capacity of Hubco, 42 percent 
from Kohinoor Electric and 45 percent from Kot Addu Power Company (KAPCO).6  
3If the company does not install and/or deliver the guaranteed capacity, the company is liable to 
pay “Liquidated Damages” to WAPDA. 
4The term “Capacity Purchase Price” conveys a misleading impression that the said charge is 
only for capacity usage by WAPDA. In fact the CPP comprises all of the listed costs under this category. 
5The FERI coverage in the CPP is available only to Hubco and not other IPPs because such 
policy was discontinued by the SBP. The FERI is charged by Hubco to WAPDA each 6 months in 
January and July which significantly affects the tariff for these months. Hubco pays the FERI payments 
received from WAPDA to the SBP who has provided this coverage. Other IPPs foreign exchange risk is 
self insured by WAPDA. Due to constant devaluation WAPDA’s self insurance is much more expensive 
than the FERI rate of Hubco. Thus, compared to Hubco, WAPDA pays more to other IPPs for their 
uncovered foreign exchange positions. 
6 Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook (1998). 
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The actual tariffs charged by all IPPs, other than Hubco, are governed by the 
1994 Power Policy. The policy stipulates a bulk power tariff of 6.5 US Cents per 
kWh. The tariff paid by WAPDA to Hubco is based on the Reference Tariff (RT). 
How was the RT arrived at? When the project was set up the project sponsors were 
offered an 18 percent rate of return (IRR) over the project life.7 This return was 
considered “fair” and “correct” economic return. To achieve this return and also to 
cover all project costs a revenue stream was calculated. This revenue stream or 
profile of the RT (for each year of the project life) was agreed between WAPDA  and 
IPPs at the time that the Power Purchase Agreements were signed. 
The RT profile was calculated on the following assumptions: 
 (i) WAPDA would be the sole purchaser of electricity from IPPs8 and it 
would purchase atleast 60 percent load of the installed capacity. 
 (ii) An 18 percent Real Rate of Return (IRR) in US Dollars would be earned 
by the project investors. 
 (iii) Fuel Price was deemed to be a pass through item. The RT profile was 
calculated using the fuel price of 1994. However, being a pass through 
item, actual tariffs are allowed to be adjusted for the prevailing fuel prices. 
 (iv) The SBP was to make available the foreign exchange for the project. The 
RT profile for the life of the project was calculated by using the exchange 
rate for 1993. 
 (v) The Project Cost was fixed as of the signing of the PPA. 
 
The RT is a base tariff profile. It is not the actual tariff that is paid by 
WAPDA to IPPs. The actual tariff accounts for actual inflation, exchange rates, fuel 
prices and interest rates as well as actual Additional Costs. Since these economic 
variables have been rising between 1994–99, the actual tariffs for the same period are 
higher than the computed reference Tariffs. 
 
4.  CAUSES OF RISING ELECTRICITY TARIFFS 
Electricity tariffs have indeed risen since 1994. The increase in current tariff 
over the agreed 1994 tariff is given below: 
 Reference Tariff : Rs 1.758/kWh9 
 Current Tariff : Rs 3.265/kWh10 
 Increase in Tariff : Rs 1.507kWh 
7The 18 percent return is Hubco specific. Other IPPs returns are governed by the 1994 PPA. 
8Except Tapal Engergy which sells power to Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC), other 
IPPs can only sell to WAPDA. 
9This number represents the average Reference Tariff charged over the 2–12 year period of the 
project life. The average has been taken of the Reference Tariff profile given in the PPA. 
10The reported Current Tariff number is also an average number. It is the average of the actual 
tariffs billed till 1999 and the expected tariffs till the 12th year of the 2–12 year period. 
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Table 1 
Increase in Tariff Components 
Factors Rs/kWh % Increase Parities Involved 
Fuel Price 
Rupee Devaluation 
Consumer Price Inflation 
Supplemental Charges11 
Additional Costs12 
Interest Rates 
Others 
Total 
0.731 
0.467 
0.155 
0.040 
0.046 
0.014 
0.055 
1.508 
48% 
31% 
10% 
3% 
3% 
1% 
4% 
100% 
PSO/GOP 
GOP 
GOP 
GOP 
GOP 
Int. Markets 
Others 
 
The component wise breakdown of the tariff increase is: 
 
Table 1 shows that between 1994 and 1998, 95 percent of the tariff increase of 
Hubco, has been due to factors which can be related to the Government of Pakistan. 
The Government of Pakistan’s role can be seen from the fact that 48 percent of the 
tariff increase has been due to escalation in fuel prices, 31 percent due to rupee 
devaluation, 10 percent due to inflation and 6 percent due to increase in costs which 
are attributable to Government of Pakistan levies. All of these factors are completely 
outside the control of IPPs as well as WAPDA, therefore, neither IPPs nor the state 
utility, WAPDA, can be blamed for tariff escalation due to these factors. 
 
5.  COST OF PRODUCTION OF IPPs, 
VS. WAPDA  AND KESC 
The above section has enumerated the reasons for tariff increase between the 
period spanning 1994–99. It has still not answered the central question: Do IPPs 
produce expensive electricity? The answer is based on the microeconomics of a 
power plant which translates itself into marginal and average costs of production per 
kilowatt of electricity.13  
11Supplemental Charges are billed to WAPDA in respect of “Start up Costs” and “Passs Through 
Items” such as Octroi, various Taxes and Duties. 
12Additional Costs are specific and agreed expenses which were met by the project Company at 
the time of construction. These costs are gradually recovered through the tariff over the life of the project. 
13Data source is “Energy Data on Thermal Power Stations” from Pakistan Energy Yearbook, 
1998. Sceptics can always criticise the use of the government statistics, but this is the best data set 
available todate. Whatever, the shortcomings of this data, atleast it would not be biased towards IPPs and 
the author cannot be accused of using a data set which suits him. 
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The average cost of production of an electric utility includes fuel costs, 
depreciation charges, interest costs on debt, maintenance costs, administrative costs 
etc. Unfortunately, the Pakistan Energy Yearbook only reports the overall average 
cost of production for WAPDA but not for IPPs. Hence, a comparative analysis is not 
possible. But fuel costs are reported for IPPs as well as WAPDA and KESC. Thus, I 
am constrained to restrict my analysis to comparative fuel costs only. This is, 
however, substantial, as 95 percent of the variable costs (EPP) of generating a unit of 
electricity are fuel costs, and variable costs are approximately 40 percent of the total 
costs. 
Even when we compare fuel costs we have to be careful to compare IPPs oil 
fired plants with WAPDA’s oil fired plants only. But this is not directly possible as 
almost all of WAPDA’s plants are multifuel i.e. they run on oil, gas, diesel etc. 
Diesel is more expensive than oil and gas is the cheapest of the three fuels. Due to 
the usage of gas, the average fuel cost for WAPDA’s plants should be much lower 
than IPPs oil fired plants. However, inspite of this fuel cost advantage, WAPDA’s 
and KESC’s fuel costs are on average greater than IPPs. The evidence in the 
following Table 2 makes a point, it debunks the common misperception that IPPs 
produce expensive electricity. 
 
Table 2 
Cost of Fuel of IPPs vs. WAPDA and KESC 
Power Station 
Installed Capacity 
(MW) Fuel Used 
Average Fuel 
Cost (Rs/kWh 
WAPDA 
Faisalabad 
Multan 
Muzzafar Garh 
Guddu 
Jamshoro 
KESC 
Korangi 
Korangi Town 
Pipri 
IPPs 
AES Pak Gen. M. Garth 
Hubco. Hub 
Tapal Energy, Karachi 
 
132 
260 
1350 
640 
850 
 
250 
100 
1260 
 
365 
1292 
126 
 
Gas and Oil 
Gas and Oil 
Gas, Oil and Diesel 
Gas and Oil 
Gas and Oil 
 
Gas and Oil 
Gas and Diesel 
Oil and Diesel 
 
Oil 
Fuel Oil 
Fuel Oil 
 
1.87 
1.79 
1.53 
1.22 
1.65 
 
1.43 
2.11 
1.51 
 
1.43 
1.37 
1.37 
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The Table also shows that each and every IPP is cheaper than WAPDA and 
KESC, WAPDA’s Guddu plant is cheaper than IPPs but this is only to be expected 
as it generates electricity largely from the cheaper gas. Hubco’s costs are 11 percent 
cheaper than WAPDA’s most modern Muzzafargarh plant. 15 percent cheaper than 
Jamshoro plant.14 23 percent cheaper than Multan plant and 30 percent cheaper than 
the Faisalabad plant. 
While the above analysis is instructive, it suffers from one shortcoming i.e. it 
compares WAPDA’s average multi-fuel cost with IPPs single-fuel cost of furnace oil. 
The above table shows that WAPDA does not separately report the cost of the 
various fuels used on its power plants. Instead, WAPDA lumps together the costs of 
the various fuels and reports one number, i.e., the average cost of all the fuels. This 
lumped average per unit cost is not comparable to IPPs’ single fuel, furnace oil costs. 
A comparative analysis is still possible if we calculate WAPDA’s cost of production 
from furnace oil only which is possible once we separate the per kWh cost of oil 
from the per kWh cost of gas (and/or diesel) contained in the lumped average fuel 
cost for WAPDA’s plants. 
Not all of WAPDA’s power plants are considered for fuel cost comparison 
with IPPs’ (Hubco) power plants. Only larger power plants are considered to match 
Hubco’s 1292 MW installed capacity. The WAPDA power plants used for 
comparative analysis are located at Muzzafargarh (1350 MW), Guddu (640 MW) and 
Jamshoro (850 MW). All of these power stations a re multi-fuel. 
It was assumed that the cost of gas used at Muzzafargarh Plant is the same as 
the cost of gas at WAPDA’s Guddu Plant 2, which runs only on gas and whose gas 
costs are 0.97/kWh of generated electricity. Similarly, it was assumed that the cost of 
diesel contained in the average fuel cost of Muzzafargarh plant would be the same as 
the cost of diesel of WAPDA’s Pasni plant which runs only on diesel. The cost of 
diesel at Pasni plant is reported at Rs 2.6/kWh of generated electricity. All other 
numbers, i.e. generated capacity in kWh, and fuel costs in Rs/GWh are published.15 
Therefore, it is a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate the cost of furnace oil for 
the Muzafargarh plant which is Rs 1.63. 
A shortcoming of the calculations needs mention. The individual fuel costs of 
oil and gas do not add up to the average fuel cost. This is because of the reason 
mentioned above, that the breakdown costs of various fuels used at WAPDA’s 
individual plants was not available and substituted prices from other WAPDA plants 
were only an approximation. A better methodology to infer individual fuel costs at 
WAPDA’s plants is to calculate the fuel cost in terms of input-out ratio of energy. 
14The 15 percent cost advantage to Hubco accrues inspite of the fact that WAPDA’s Jamshoro 
plant generates almost 60 percent of its total generation from gas. 
15See the “Energy Data of Thermal Power Stations” (Table 5.11) in the Pakistan Energy 
Yearbook, 1998. 
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Table 3 
WAPDA’s Fuel Costs of Generation 
Units Generated From  
WAPDA’s Power Plants Gas Oil Diesel  
Muzaffar Garh Plant 
Units Generated (kWh) 
Average Fuel Cost (Rs/kWh) 
Total Cost (Rs) 
 
645,900 
0.9774 
631,302.6 
 
3,637,250 
1.6349* 
5,946,547.4 
 
190 
2,6496 
503.424 
 
=4,283,340 
1.5358 
=6,578,353.5 
Guddu (Units 1–4) Plant 
Units Generated (kWh) 
Average Fuel Cost (Rs/kWh) 
Total Cost (Rs) 
 
1,600,700 
0.9774 
1.564.524.1 
 
214,020 
3.11167* 
665,960.4 
 
– 
 
– 
 
=1.814.730 
1.2291 
=2.230.484.6 
Jamshoro Plant 
Units Generated (kWh) 
Average Fuel Cost (Rs/kWh) 
Total Cost (Rs.) 
 
1.233,930 
0.9774 
1.206,043.1 
 
848,320 
2.64895* 
2,247,160.2 
 
– 
– 
– 
 
=2.082.250 
1.6584 
=3.453.203.4 
* These are all derived values from the rest of the information in Table 5.11 of Pakistan Energy Yearbook 
and reproduced in Table 3. 
 
Now that we have derived the cost of furnace oil contained in WAPDA’s 
average fuel costs, we can compare WAPDA’s furnace oil costs with IPPs furnace oil 
costs  (See Table 4). The conclusion derived in Table 1, that , WAPDA’s costs of 
production with furnace oil for each plant are far greater than IPP fuel costs is 
strengthened in Table 4. Hubco’s furnace oil costs per kWh of electricity are cheaper 
than all of WAPDA’s plants.  
 
Table 4 
Comparative Cost of Furnace Oil 
Power Station 
Installed Capacity 
(MW) 
Average Cost of Furnace 
Oil (Rs/kWh) 
WAPDA 
Muzzafar Garh 
Guddu 
Jamshoro 
UPPs 
AES Lalpir, M. Garh 
ASFS Pak Gen., M. Garh 
Hubco. Hub 
Tapal Energy, Karachi 
 
1350 
640 
850 
 
362 
365 
1292 
126 
 
1.63* 
3.11* 
2.64* 
 
1.74 
1.43 
1.37 
1.37 
Source: Table 5.11, Pakistan Energy Yearbook, 1998. 
          * Derived numbers from Table 5.11, Pakistan Energy Yearbook, 1998. 
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Savings by IPPs 
Having established that Hubco generates cheaper power than WAPDA, we 
now calculate how much the country could have saved had Hubco produced the same 
mega watts of electricity being currently generated at WAPDA’s plants. 
The following simple arithmetic exercise was carried out. 
 (i) We first took the capacity of a WAPDA plant (in kilo watt hours) and 
multiplied it with the WAPDA fuel cost of oil in Rs per kWh. This gave us 
the total expenditure that WAPDA would incur were it to produce the total 
capacity of its multi-fuel power plants by only using oil. 
 (ii) We again took the capacity of a WAPDA plant but multiplied it with the 
cost of Hubco’s fuel oil cost. This  gave us the total fuel oil expenditure 
that Hubco would incur were it to produce equivalent power as being 
currently generated by WAPDA. 
 
Note that while a tonne of oil costs the same to Hubco and WAPDA, the 
more efficient of the two utility companies would use lesser fuel and 
consequently its cost of producing one unit of electricity from oil (alone) would 
be cheaper. 
The total expenditure on electricity by Hubco and WAPDA and the savings 
achieved by Hubco are presented below alongwith all calculations. (See Table 5) 
 
Table 5 
Cost Savings 
Power Plants 
Units Generated 
from Fuel Oil 
kWh 
Average Fuel Oil Cost
Rs/kWh 
Total Cost 
Rs 
Muzzafargarh 3,637,250.000 
3,637,250,000 
1,6349* 
1,3796** 
Savings
5,946,540.025 
5,017,950,100 
928,589,925 
Guddu 214,020,000 
214,020,000 
3,11167* 
1,3796 
Savings
665,959,613.4 
295,261,992 
370697621.4 
Jamshoro 848,320,000 
848,320,000 
2,64895* 
1,3796 
Savings
2,247,157,264 
1,170,342,272 
1,076,814,992 
Source: All data is from Table 5.11 “Energy Data of Thermal Power Stations (1997-98)”. 
          * WAPDA’s derived per kWh fuel oil costs. 
        ** Hubco’s published per kWh fuel oil costs. 
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The unambiguous conclusion of this exercise is that because Hubco’s per unit 
cost of production is cheaper, therefore, if Hubco had produced the same electricity 
instead of WAPDA, the total combined savings  would have been $4.65 billion for 
the year 1997-98. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The paper uses cost data of IPPs and WAPDA/KESC to inquire whether IPPs 
produce expensive electricity. The findings are: 
 (i) IPPs produce cheaper electricity than both WAPDA and KESC. 
 (ii) The country would have saved atleast $4.65 billion had the same power 
been produced by IPPs (Hubco). 
 
The Findings should not be surprising as IPPs are more efficient than the state 
utility WAPDA. The evidence puts a great dent in the logic of the IPP bashers who 
allege that IPPs produce expensive power because their project costs were high due 
to kickbacks to the Government of Pakistan. While public debate may still continue 
on whether IPPs indulged in kickbacks and corruption, there is no empirical evidence 
to show that IPPs produce expensive electricity.  
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